



KADENA

Pact: Smart Contracts You Can Take To The Bank

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Outline

- 1 Blockchain Background
- 2 Problems with Smart Contracts
- 3 How Pact Solves Them

Background

What are Blockchains?



- Tamper proof append-only digital storage
- Same data stored on many computers
- Everyone agrees exactly (consensus)
- Don't need to trust a central source of truth
- The network is the source of truth

Smart Contracts

- Not smart
- Not contracts
- Just computer programs
- Stored and run in a blockchain

Smart Contract Programming is Different

- Every operation runs on thousands of different computers
- Same inputs must always give exactly the same outputs

Otherwise how will you establish consensus?

- Stakes are high with lots of digital money on the line
- Must pay transaction fees to interact with blockchain programs
- Code is immortalized forever

A person is walking a tightrope high above a dense forest. The person is wearing a black long-sleeved shirt, a blue harness, and white pants with black zebra stripes. They are barefoot and have their arms outstretched for balance. The background shows a vast, hazy landscape with a forest of evergreen trees and a steep, rocky mountain slope on the right. The text "Correctness more important than usual" is overlaid in the center in a bold, white, sans-serif font.

**Correctness more
important than usual**

The Problem

A close-up photograph showing a massive number of ladybugs, likely Asian lady beetles, covering a field of green grass. The ladybugs are small, with orange-red bodies and black spots. They are densely packed in some areas, particularly along the blades of grass, and more sparsely distributed in others. The grass is a vibrant green, and the overall scene suggests a large-scale infestation or migration of the insects.

Bugs

Bugs



- 25+% of contracts tested had exception vulnerabilities (a specific type of bug)
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/633.pdf>
- And that's just one category of bugs

**Increases risk and
slows adoption**



Problems with Smart Contract Languages



- Based on mainstream languages
- Code stored in the blockchain is not human readable
- Hard to verify
- ...

Rubixi: Mainstream paradigm strikes

Contract Source Code </>

```
1 contract Rubixi {
2
3     //Declare variables for storage critical to contract
4     uint private balance = 0;
5     uint private collectedFees = 0;
6     uint private feePercent = 10;
7     uint private pyramidMultiplier = 300;
8     uint private payoutOrder = 0;
9
10    address private creator;
11
12    //Sets creator
13    function DynamicPyramid() {
14        creator = msg.sender;
15    }
16
```

- Actual smart contract
- Contract got renamed, but not the constructor
- Result: anyone can become owner of the contract

**The OO paradigm and the
associated DRY violation
directly caused Rubixi bug**

Mainstream Languages Not Sufficient

- **Rubixi problem would never be perceived as significant in OO languages**

Two minute fix and then move on

- **Don't guarantee determinism**

(same inputs = same outputs)

- **Don't provide enough safety**

Null pointers

Unprincipled type conversions

etc...

Unreadable code in the blockchain

- Authors can publish the code and associate it with the contract but...

- Only ~1% of contracts have available source code

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.06038.pdf>

Hard to Verify

- Fallback functions complicate control flow
- Values can be mutated
- Turing Complete

How Pact Addresses These Problems

**Didn't default to flawed paradigm
just because it's popular**

Purpose-built with smart contracts in mind

- Code in the blockchain is human readable
- Smart contracts can be updated/fixed
- Designed for storing data
- Built-in auth
- Can't put encryption keys in code
- NOT Turing Complete
- Values are immutable
- Open source, written in Haskell by people familiar with cutting-edge programming languages.

Hello World

```
1 (define-keyset 'hello-admin (read-keyset 'hello-keyset))
2
3 (module hello 'hello-admin
4   "Pact hello-world with database example"
5
6   (defschema hello-schema
7     "VALUE stores greeting recipient"
8     value:string)
9
10  (deftable hellos:{hello-schema})
11
12  (defun hello (value)
13    "Store VALUE to say hello with."
14    (write hellos "hello" { 'value: value }))
15
16  (defun greet ()
17    "Say hello to stored value."
18    (with-read hellos "hello" { "value" := value }
19      (format "Hello, {}!" [value])))
20  )
21
22 (create-table hellos)
23
24 (hello "world") ;; store "hello"
25 (greet)         ;; say hello!
```

Formal Verification

Formal Verification

- Proves things about your program for all possible inputs
- Impossible to actually test them all
- Significantly benefits from not being Turing Complete

Formal Verification Example

```
1 (defun abs:integer (x:integer)
2   ("Returns the absolute value of an integer"
3     (properties
4       [(>= result 0)
5         (not (table-read 'accounts))
6         (not (table-write 'accounts))]))
7   (if (< x 0)
8       (- x)
9       x))
```


Recap

Recap

- **Humans mess up**

Always operating at the edge of manageable complexity

- **Stakes are higher with smart contracts, correctness more important**

- **Need systems that make common mistakes impossible**

- **Pact: Purpose built, human readable, verifiable**

More Info



- Docs: <http://kadena.io/pact>
- REPL: <http://kadena.io/try-pact>
- <https://github.com/kadena-io/pact>
- We're hiring!
- doug@kadena.io